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Ethics Versus Success? The
Acceptance of Unethical Leadership
in the 2016 US Presidential Elections
Catarina Morais1* , Dominic Abrams2 and Georgina Randsley de Moura2
1 Research Centre for Human Development, Faculty of Education and Psychology, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Porto,
Portugal, 2 Centre for the Study of Group Processes, School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom
Before and after the 2016 US Presidential Election, this research examined Trump
and Clinton supporters’ attributions about behavior of each leader, both of whose
ethicality had been publicly questioned. American voters (N = 268) attributed significantly
more dispositional factors to the outgroup leader than to the ingroup leader. Moreover,
when the ingroup candidate won the election (i.e., among Trump supporters), unethical
leadership subsequently became more acceptable and there was less desire to tighten
the election process when dealing with unethical candidates. The opposite pattern was
found among voters whose ingroup candidate lost the election (Clinton supporters). The
results and implications are discussed.
Keywords: unethical, leadership, causal attribution, group processes, election
INTRODUCTION
Individuals have a basic need to understand others to ensure efficient social interaction and
exchange. This social understanding is achieved by knowing why people do what they do: causal
knowledge. When searching for causes, people generally resort to processes that require the
least cognitive effort, such as reliance on heuristics and stereotypes, to judge and categorize
others’ behaviors (Kahneman, 2003). As such, individuals spontaneously infer the causal locus of
individuals’ behaviors based on categorization, stereotypes and automatic processing, with causes
and consequences of behavior grounded on quickly accessible schemas. A primary question is
whether someone’s behavior is the result of their disposition to behave in that particular way or
a response to situational constraints (e.g., Kelley and Michela, 1980). It is known that distinctive
and consistent behaviors are likely to be attributed to dispositions more than to situations.
Relevant for political campaigns and the present research is the fact that individuals are
particularly sensitive to group leaders’ behavior because leaders are distinctive but also central
representatives of the group (Haslam et al., 2001; Hogg, 2001; van Knippenberg and van
Knippenberg, 2005). Furthermore, during political campaigns group identity and leadership are
generally very salient, and candidates’ behaviors are scrutinized closely. The 2016 US Presidential
Election was no exception. The main candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, were both
systematically presented in the media as unethical leaders (e.g., The New York Times, 2015,
2016a,b; The Telegraph, 2017). The present research examines voters’ attributions for leadership
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candidates’ behavior when both ingroup and outgroup leaders
have been portrayed and described as unethical, and how
perceptions of the leaders may depend on perceivers’ group
membership (Democrat, Republican). We were interested in
testing how such perceptions change before and after the election,
in the light of ingroup success or failure. The central general
proposition, tested in this research, is that when unethical
leadership is combined with ingroup success, it encourages a
subsequent relaxation of ethical standards, both to justify the
success and to enable unethical success to continue.
Ethical and Unethical Leadership
Ethical leadership has been defined as “the demonstration of
normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and
interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct
to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement,
and decision-making” (Brown et al., 2005, p. 120). This
definition encompasses different and important features of
ethical leadership, including being a credible role model and
taking ethical issues into consideration when making a decision
(Neves and Story, 2015).
The ethical leadership framework holds that leaders are
frequently perceived as legitimate role models for normative
behavior because of their position within an organization or
group (e.g., Mayer et al., 2012). Perceived legitimacy likely
enables ethical leaders to influence followers’ ethical conduct.
Such legitimacy is achieved as a consequence of followers’
perceptions that the leader behaves in a normatively appropriate
manner, is honest, and has altruistic rather than selfish
motivation (cf. Brown et al., 2005; Brown and Treviño, 2006;
De Hoogh and Den Hartog, 2008).
The ethical leadership framework is consistent with the
social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001), which argues
that the fundamental mechanism of leadership is the leader’s
ability to embody the normative prototype, i.e., the cognitive
representation of the characteristics of the group (e.g., Hogg,
2001; Rast, 2015). Therefore, the more prototypical an individual
group member is, the more likely that individual is to
emerge as the leader because they are viewed by members
as best representing the identity of the group (Hogg, 2001;
Hogg et al., 2012).
One reason why ingroup and outgroup unethical leaders
receive different reactions to their behaviors is because a negative
evaluation of a central member of one’s own group conflicts
with the need to maintain a positive social identity (Marques
et al., 2001; Pinto et al., 2010; Randsley de Moura et al., 2011;
Abrams et al., 2013).
Expressing disapproval to an unethical leader may reflect
an effort to exert social control over that deviant (cf. Brauer
and Chekroun, 2005; Chekroun, 2008), but communicating
disapproval directly to the leader may not be feasible, particularly
if the group is very large. Previous research has established
that ingroup leaders are often given latitude to deviate from
group norms (Abrams et al., 2018). Ingroup leaders who
commit unethical actions are less likely to be derogated or
punished than other ingroup members or outgroup leaders
and members who commit the same transgressive actions;
a phenomenon labeled ‘transgression credit’ (Abrams et al., 2013;
Randsley de Moura and Abrams, 2013).
One explanation for transgression credit is that derogating an
ingroup leader may be perceived by other ingroup members as
acting against the group. Group members’ motivation to preserve
the value of the leader and show respect and loyalty for the
group therefore inhibits their critical response to their leader’s
transgressions (Zdaniuk and Levine, 2001; Abrams et al., 2013).
It is also important to note that transgression credit is more likely
to be granted under certain conditions, particularly when the
transgression is perceived to be for the benefit of the group and
not for leaders’ personal interest (Abrams et al., 2013, 2014).
Previous research has also shown that the outcome of
an unethical act may impact group members’ willingness to
exert social control and even accept the leaders’ transgression.
Morton et al. (2007) showed that ingroup success may be
also a boundary condition for group members’ acceptance of
deviance. They found that, in a political context, if ingroup
members perceived that public opinion was against the group,
they gave more support to a candidate whose deviance was
linked to having a better chance of being elected. Under such
circumstances (ingroup failure), group members also tend to
seize on opportunities to challenge the legitimacy of the outgroup
success (cf. shifting standards model; Biernat and Manis, 1994;
Biernat, 2003) and, therefore, may be more willing to invoke
moral standards to do so.
Group Membership and Causal
Attributions of Behavior
Attribution theories emphasize people’s tendency to identify
dispositional and situational causes for others’ behavior (Gilbert
and Malone, 1995), affecting one’s perception of the amount
of control that a certain individual has within a specific
situation (Nisbett, 1973). The fundamental attribution error
(Heider, 1958) is the tendency to make inferences regarding
someone’s unique and enduring dispositions based on behaviors
that can be fully explained by the context or situation in
which they occur (Gilbert and Malone, 1995). Similar effects
occur at the group level, as people make stronger dispositional
attributions for outgroup members’ behavior than for ingroup
members’ behavior (Allison and Messick, 1985), particularly
based on the behavior’s outcome for the group. Indeed, the
tendency to attribute ingroup success and outgroup failure to
internal dispositions (internal characteristics of the group or
their members), and ingroup failure and outgroup success to
external factors is referred to as the ultimate attribution error
(characteristics of the situation; Pettigrew, 1979). For example,
Allison and Messick (1985) found that people also tend to assume
that a group’s decision-making is influenced by the attitudes of
group members, while ignoring the impact of decision-making
rules and group norms.
Interestingly, the ultimate attribution error is particularly
strong when people judge outgroups and, more specifically, for
negative behaviors (Allison and Messick, 1985). Taken together,
these findings suggest that dispositional attributions are more
likely for outgroup members’ negative behavior. This suggests
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that leaders’ unethical actions are more likely to be attributed to
a disposition of the leader when people judge outgroup leaders
than when they judge ingroup leaders, and that this relationship
might be strengthened in cases of outgroup success/ingroup
failure and weakened in cases of outgroup failure/ingroup success
(e.g., victory/loss in elections).
Another way in which group membership affects attributions
is that people differentiate less among outgroup members
than among ingroup members in their attributions about
different group members’ behavior. This is because outgroups are
perceived to be more homogeneous (Quattrone and Jones, 1980).
In the present research, we test how group membership
affects evaluations and causal attributions when members face the
situation of choosing between two reportedly unethical leaders,
and how those evaluations and attributions change based on
ingroup success. The US Presidential Election of 2016 provided
an opportune moment to pursue this research question because
the two main candidates had both been perceived to be, and
widely reported as, unethical. Thus, we examined how Clinton
and Trump supporters evaluated their respective leaders and
their judgments and desirability of leaders’ ethicality in general,
before and after the election. The preceding review led us to
propose several hypotheses:
H1 – Transgression Credit
We expect participants to perceive the ingroup unethical leader
as (a) more prototypical and (b) to express more confidence
that s/he will be a good president than the outgroup unethical
leader. Moreover, (c) we predict a transgression credit effect
such that participants will evaluate the ingroup unethical
leader more positively and as less self-promoting than the
outgroup unethical leader, and (d) this effect is likely to be
strengthened post-election.
H2 – Attributional Bias
(a) Based on the ultimate attribution error, outgroup unethical
leaders’ behavior will be attributed more to dispositional and
stable factors than will that of ingroup unethical leaders. We
also expect this relationship (b) to be stronger for the candidate
that loses the election and weaker for the candidate that
wins the election.
H3 – Effect of Success
We expect participants to attribute (a) higher personal
control and lower external control to the outgroup unethical
leader than to the ingroup unethical leader; (b) and this
difference should be stronger if the outgroup unethical leader
wins the election, and weaker if the ingroup leader wins
the election, because of the value of the outcome of the
election to the group.
H4 – Outcome Based Shift of Standards
(a) Voters should regard unethical leadership to be more
unacceptable and they should support measures of social control
more if the ingroup unethical leader loses the election and (b)




Participants were recruited using the Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Initially, 770 participants started the survey, but only
549 met the inclusion criteria and, therefore, were eligible
and allowed to proceed. From our initial sample of 549, 154
participants were excluded because they failed attention checks
(resulting n = 395). Exclusion was equally distributed among
supporters of both candidates, χ2(1) = 2.18, p = 0.140. Wave 2
(post-election) was completed by 268 participants (68%; attrition
rates did not differ per candidate supported, χ2(1) = 0.04,
p = 0.844, 38% amongst Trump supporters and 37% amongst
Clinton supporters). Eight participants were removed because
they reported that they had not voted. Thus, our final sample
included 260 participants who completed both waves.
Before the election, 61% of participants said that they would
vote for Hillary Clinton and 39% for Donald Trump, but 6%
changed their mind between waves. Therefore, in Wave 2, 56%
of our sample reported voting for Hillary Clinton (n = 146),
39% for Donald Trump (n = 100), and 5% for a different
candidate (n = 14).
Participants (122 males, 138 females) were aged between 19
and 75 years old (M = 43.91, SD = 13.46). Participant gender
was not significantly related to candidate voted for (χ2 = 4.66,
p = 0.097), and as such was not considered further as a factor.
Participants all reported being American, and 79% as employed at
the time. The majority of participants indicated they were White
(85%), followed by Asian (5%), Hispanic (5%), African American
(2%), other race (2%), and Mixed race (1%).
The study employed a 2 (Supported candidate: Donald
Trump vs. Hillary Clinton) × 2 (Judged candidate: Donald
Trump vs. Hillary Clinton) × 2 (Wave: Pre-election vs.
Post-election) mixed design, with Supported candidate as a
between-participants factor, and Judged candidate and Wave as
within-participants’ factors. We will refer to ingroup condition
when Clinton Supporters judge Hillary Clinton and when
Trump Supporters judge Donald Trump, and the outgroup
condition when participants made judgments about the opposing
candidate (Clinton Voters-Donald Trump; Trump Voters-
Hillary Clinton).
Procedure
In order to achieve a demographically diverse and geographically
dispersed sample and to collect data in a short period of
time (cf. Kees et al., 2017), and also to avoid an effect of
major events in the campaign, participants were recruited via
Amazon’s MTurk 1 week either side of the election. Before
the election (Wave 1, pre-election), participants were asked to
complete an online study on Qualtrics about their perceptions
regarding the 2016 US Presidential Election. Participants first
answered four pre-screening questions/inclusion criteria. The
survey only continued if participants indicated they were (1)
eligible voters, (2) Americans, (3) had an intention to vote in
the election (participants who did not wanted to vote or that
had voted absentee were excluded), and (4) intended to vote
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either for Donald Trump or for Hillary Clinton – the two target
candidates for this study.
Using the software TurkPrime, those who participated in W1
(Pre-election) were contacted via email and asked to complete
the W2 (Post-election), a week after the election. We expected
up to 50% retention rate and power analysis suggested we
therefore require a final sample of 166 participants to achieve
90% power in a 2 (between) × 2 × 2 (within) design. We
therefore oversampled initially. According to sensitivity analysis,
this sample size (246) provided 90% power (α = 0.05) to detect
an effect size as small as 0.294 (ηp2 = 0.021) for main effects
of supported candidate, 0.180 (ηp2 = 0.008) for main effects of
judged candidate and wave (assuming a correlation of 0.50 for
the repeated measures), and 0.180 (ηp2 = 0.008) for the between-




To control for differences between Trump and Clinton
supporters’ pre-voting conceptions about their preferred
candidate’s ethicality, national identification, interest in the
election, and confidence in their candidate, we included the
following measures:
Perceived ethicality
To measure general preconceptions about the two candidates
we adapted the Ethical Leadership Scale (Brown et al., 2005),
by asking participants to imagine their preferred candidate as
President of the United States, and to rate their agreement
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with 10 statements
concerning the prospective conduct of that candidate in the
White House with other employees (e.g., “Sets an example of how
to do things the right way in terms of ethics”). The average of their
responses was computed into a global score of perceived ethicality
for pre-election (W1, α = 0.98) and post-election (W2, α = 0.99).
National identification
Participants rated their agreement with six statements (e.g.,
“I am proud to be an American”; 1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree). The items were adapted from Duriez
et al. (2013). A national identification score was computed for
both waves (α = 0.96, α = 0.95, respectively) based on the
average of responses.
Electoral interest
Before the election (W1), and adapted from Bølstad et al. (2013),
participants were asked nine questions regarding their level of
interest in the election (e.g., “How interested are you in the
Presidential Election”; 1 = not at all, 7 = very interested), and
their voting habits (e.g., “Do you usually vote on Presidential
elections?”; 1 = never, 7 = always). A single score was computed
by averaging participants’ responses (α = 0.88).
Dependent Variables
American prototypicality
Participants rated their agreement with five statements (e.g.,
“Donald Trump [Hillary Clinton] is a good example of
the kind of people Americans are,” 1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree) adapted from Platow and van Knippenberg
(2001). Responses were averaged to form a prototypicality score
(W1, α = 0.97; W2, α = 0.98).
Confidence in the candidate
Before the election (W1), participants were asked “How confident
are you that Donald Trump [Hillary Clinton] will be a good
President?” (0–100).
Evaluation
Participants rated the candidates (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree) on 15 traits of warmth and competence (e.g.,
“trustworthy,” adapted from Fiske et al., 2002; Cuddy et al., 2004).
A principal component analysis with Promax rotation revealed
one factor (explaining 82% of variance) and, therefore, these traits
were collapsed into a single score of evaluation by averaging the
items (W1, α = 0.98; W2, α = 0.99).
Self-promoting motivation
Participants classified to what extent they believed Donald Trump
[Hillary Clinton] ran for Presidency thinking about “the best
interests of Americans as a whole” and “his [her] own best
interests” (0–100). A Motivation Score was created by subtracting
one item from the other so positive scores refer to group-serving
motivation, and negative scores to self-serving motivation.
Causal attributions
Participants were asked to think about the behavior of the
candidates and to provide as many reasons as they could think
(maximum of 5) for why the candidates exhibited that behavior.
After writing the reasons, and using a 9-point bipolar scale,
we adapted the Causal Dimension Scale (McAuley et al., 1992),
asking participants to rate their perceptions of the causes of
candidates’ behavior on four dimensions: locus of causality,
personal control, external control, and stability. A principal
component analysis with Promax rotation confirmed the four
dimensions of the original scale: (1) Locus of causality (e.g.,
“Reflects an aspect of the self – of the situation,” explaining 33%
of variance; W1, α = 0.85; W2, α = 0.85), (2) Personal control (e.g.,
“Over which Donald Trump [Hillary Clinton] has power – has no
power,” explaining 19% of variance; W1, α = 0.84; W2, α = 0.88),
(3) External control (e.g., “Over which others have control –
have no control,” explaining 11% of variance; W1, α = 0.79;
W2, α = 0.83), and (4) Stability (e.g., “Permanent – Temporary,”
explaining 9% of variance; W1, α = 0.59; W2, α = 0.69). For each
dimension, participants’ scores were computed by averaging their
responses on the different items. Therefore, lower levels in the
scale indicate a more dispositional locus, higher personal control,
higher external control, and more stability.
Acceptability of unethical leadership
Participants rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely)
how “acceptable,” “good,” “adequate,” “justifiable” and “tolerable”
it is to elect an unethical leader [in general, not specific to
their candidate]. A principal component analysis with Promax
rotation revealed one factor (explaining 83% of variance).
A single score of acceptability of unethical leadership was
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computed by averaging participants’ responses (W1, α = 0.95;
W2, α = 0.97).
Election process adjustment (EPA)
Participants rated their agreement (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree) with seven statements regarding hypothetical
group actions to exert more social control. A principal
component analysis with Promax rotation revealed two factors:
(1) Stricter process (e.g., “The election process should make it
more difficult for someone to become a presidential candidate”;
W1, α = 0.77; W2, α = 0.85, explaining 35% of variance); and
(2) Tolerance of criminality (e.g., “The election process should
allow people with criminal records to be candidates”; α = 0.51;
W2, α = 0.57, explaining 18% of variance). Participants responses




A Supported candidate × Judged candidate × Wave mixed
ANOVA revealed non-significant main effects of Supported
candidate, F(1,235) = 0.20, p = 0.655, and Judged candidate,
F(1,235) = 1.09, p = 0.298. Both candidates were perceived as
unethical (M = 3.45, SD = 0.76), as perceived ethicality of both
candidates was tested against the scale midpoint (4): Donald
Trump (M = 3.13, SD = 1.99) was perceived as unethical:
t(259) = 12.87, p < 0.001, CI [−1.00, −0.74], whilst this
perception was only marginal for Hillary Clinton (M = 3.77,
SD = 1.99): t(259) = 1.86, p = 0.064, CI [−0.47, 0.01].
A significant main effect of Wave showed that candidates
were considered to be less unethical after (M = 3.35,
SD = 0.77) the election than before (M = 3.55, SD = 0.75),
F(1,235) = 34.12, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.127. A significant Supported
candidate × Judged candidate interaction, F(1,235) = 805.47,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.774, showed that Trump supporters evaluated
him as more ethical than Hillary Clinton [t(99) = 18.42, p< 0.001,
g = 2.80, CI [2.41, 3.19]; M = 5.06, SD = 1.32; M = 1.87, SD = 0.91,
respectively] whereas Clinton supporters evaluated her as more
ethical than Donald Trump (M = 5.11, SD = 1.29; M = 1.71,
SD = 1.00, respectively), t(145) = 21.93, p < 0.001, g = −2.87,
CI [−3.21, −2.53]. No other interactions were significant (all
Fs ≤ 1.07, p ≥ 0.302).
National Identification
A Supported candidate × Wave mixed ANOVA revealed
significant main effects of Supported candidate, F(1,233) = 52.13,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.183, and Wave, F(1,233) = 6.28, p = 0.013,
ηp
2 = 0.026. Trump supporters reported higher identification
with being an American (M = 6.04, SD = 1.18) than Clinton
supporters (M = 4.91, SD = 1.23); and, overall, participants
were more identified with their country before the election
(M = 5.49, SD = 1.31) than after (M = 5.28, SD = 1.49).
There was a significant Supported candidate×Wave interaction,
F(1,233) = 27.389, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.105. Simple effects tests
showed that Trump supporters’ identification increased from
pre-election (M = 5.95, SD = 1.26) to post-election (M = 6.13,
SD = 1.04), t(99) = 2.02, p = 0.047, g = −0.16, CI [−0.43, 0.12];
and the opposite pattern was revealed for Clinton supporters
(M = 5.16, SD = 1.25; M = 4.66, SD = 1.47, respectively),
t(134) = 5.53, p < 0.001, g = 0.37, CI [0.13, 0.60].
Electoral Interest
No factors significantly affected electoral interest. A one-sample
t-test comparing with the scale midpoint revealed that overall
participants were interested in the election (M = 5.69, SD = 1.09)
regardless of whom they voted for, t(244) =−1.27, p = 0.204.
Dependent Variables
A Supported candidate × Judged candidate × Wave mixed
ANCOVA was conducted for the dependent variables, with
Supported candidate as the between-participants factor,
Judged candidate and Wave as within-participants, and
perceived ethicality (for each candidate and wave) and national
identification as covariates. Participants’ identification with the
country was included as a covariate because previous research
has shown that participants’ identification is an important factor
when evaluating group members (e.g., Hutchison and Abrams,
2003). Moreover, we also wanted to ensure that any differences
on candidates’ perceived ethicality were not driving the effects.
Thus, candidates’ ethicality was controlled for and included
as a covariate. The electoral interest variable was not included
as covariate because the analysis did not yield any significant
differences. Means and standard deviations within and across the
design are shown in Table 1.
A table of ANOVA statistics without covariates is provided
(Table 2). In describing the results in the main text, we focus
on analyses with covariates included. This is in order to pursue
a more conservative presentation of the findings. In almost all
cases where effects with inclusion of covariates were p < 0.05,
the effect is stronger and the significance level smaller when
analyses were conducted without covariates. Where findings with
0.10 > p > 0.05, inclusive of covariates, are referred to as
‘marginal effects,’ these are all significant at p < 0.05 if covariates
are not included. If findings were p > 0.05 in both analyses, the
findings are described as non-significant. Only a few effects were
significant solely in the absence of covariates and p > 0.10 with
the inclusion of covariates. These are noted individually.
Transgression credit: H1 (a) Participants will perceive the
ingroup unethical leader as more prototypical and (b)
be more confident in their leadership. They will also (c)
evaluate the ingroup unethical leader more positively and
as less self-promoting than the outgroup unethical leader,
and (d) these differences will be stronger post-election.
Regarding prototypicality, the marginal main effects of
Supported candidate, F(225) = 3.27, p = 0.072, ηp2 = 0.014, and
Judged candidate, F(225) = 3.01, p = 0.084, ηp2 = 0.013, indicated
that Trump supporters tended to rate both candidates as slightly
more prototypical (M = 3.45, SD = 0.88) than Clinton supporters
(M = 3.20, SD = 0.81). Hillary Clinton was perceived to be slightly
more prototypically American (M = 3.45, SD = 0.67) than Donald
Trump (M = 3.20, SD = 0.84).
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TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations for all measures.
Variable Voters Candidate: Donald Trump Candidate: Hillary Clinton Total
W1, M (SD) W2, M (SD) Total, M (SD) W1, M (SD) W2, M (SD) Total, M (SD) W1, M (SD) W2, M (SD)
Prototypicality Trump 4.83(1.56) 5.12 (1.43) 4.97 (1.17) 1.65 (1.02) 1.77 (0.99) 1.71 (1.20) 3.24 (0.81) 3.45 (0.88)
Clinton 1.69 (0.88) 1.93 (1.25) 1.81 (1.17) 4.78 (1.41) 4.77 (1.55) 4.78 (1.19) 3.23 (0.81) 3.35 (0.88)
Total 3.01 (1.97) 3.28 (2.06) 3.39 (1.19) 3.46 (2.00) 3.51 (2.00) 3.24 (1.22) 3.24 (0.82) 3.40 (0.89)
Confidence in Trump 72.02 (25.31) 10.52 (14.74)
the candidate Clinton 7.30 (13.78) 77.88 (21.44)
Total 32.90 (37.04) 49.84 (37.52)
Evaluation Trump 4.90 (1.45) 5.22 (1.28) 5.06 (1.11) 1.78 (0.92) 1.98 (1.07) 1.88 (1.15) 3.34 (0.74) 3.60 (0.75)
Clinton 1.66 (0.91) 1.77 (1.02) 1.71 (1.11) 5.08 (1.33) 5.21 (1.36) 5.14 (1.15) 3.37 (0.74) 3.49 (0.75)
Total 3.03 (1.99) 3.23 (2.05) 3.39 (1.12) 3.68 (2.01) 3.85 (2.03) 3.51 (1.17) 3.35 (0.74) 3.55 (0.75)
Self-promoting Trump 25.63 (48.66) 41.41 (44.69) 33.52 (38.12) −73.65 (34.56) −71.98 (33.39) −72.82 (40.03) −24.01 (28.89) −15.29 (25.97)
Motivation Clinton −75.08 (36.65) −73.76 (38.76) −74.42 (38.12) 24.91 (49.90) 27.06 (46.83) 25.99 (40.03) −25.08 (28.89) −23.35 (25.97)
Total −32.59 (65.21) −25.16 (70.37) −20.45 (38.64) −16.68 (65.69) −14.73 (64.29) −23.42 (40.49) −24.55 (29.25) −19.32 (26.33)
Locus of Trump 3.21 (1.96) 2.98 (1.85) 3.10 (1.34) 2.22 (1.56) 2.51 (2.00) 2.36 (1.47) 2.71 (1.34) 2.75 (1.35)
causality Clinton 2.08 (1.48) 1.91 (1.42) 1.99 (1.77) 3.35 (1.78) 3.02 (1.59) 3.18 (1.92) 2.72 (1.33) 2.46 (1.35)
Total 2.56 (1.78) 2.36 (1.70) 2.55 (1.35) 2.87 (1.78) 2.80 (1.79) 2.77 (1.49) 2.71 (1.35) 2.60 (1.37)
Personal Trump 2.78 (1.48) 2.56 (1.61) 2.67 (1.97) 3.39 (2.34) 3.18 (2.34) 3.29 (1.66) 3.08 (1.54) 2.87 (1.67)
control Clinton 4.03 (2.61) 3.65 (2.66) 3.84 (1.98) 2.97 (1.75) 2.69 (1.53) 2.83 (1.66) 3.50 (1.53) 3.17 (1.67)
Total 3.50 (2.28) 3.19 (2.34) 3.26 (2.00) 3.14 (2.03) 2.90 (1.93) 3.06 (1.68) 3.29 (1.55) 3.02 (1.69)
External control Trump 6.37 (1.91) 6.80 (1.89) 6.59 (1.58) 6.56 (2.35) 6.10 (2.52) 6.33 (1.79) 6.89 (1.25) 7.12 (1.27)
Clinton 7.41 (1.89) 7.44 (1.95) 7.42 (1.58) 6.16 (1.89) 6.25 (1.97) 6.20 (1.79) 6.36 (1.62) 6.18 (1.71)
Total 6.97 (1.96) 7.17 (1.95) 7.01 (1.60) 6.32 (2.10) 6.19 (2.21) 6.27 (1.82) 6.62 (1.59) 6.65 (1.54)
Stability Trump 4.50 (1.87) 4.30 (1.91) 4.40 (1.69) 3.37 (1.67) 3.89 (2.03) 3.63 (1.55) 3.94 (1.48) 4.10 (1.53)
Clinton 3.66 (1.97) 4.19 (2.26 3.93 (1.70) 4.20 (1.86) 3.97 (1.80) 4.09 (1.55) 3.93 (1.47) 4.08 (1.53)
Total 4.01 (1.97) 4.24 (2.12) 4.16 (1.71) 3.85 (1.83) 3.94 (1.89) 3.86 (1.57) 3.93 (1.49) 4.09 (1.55)
Acceptability of Trump 2.04 (1.41) 2.63 (1.67)
unethical Clinton 1.77 (1.11) 1.47 (0.92)
leadership Total 1.88 (1.25) 1.97 (1.41)
EPA: Stricter Trump 4.75 (1.43) 4.13 (1.57)
process Clinton 4.55 (1.27) 5.11 (1.24)
Total 4.62 (1.34) 4.70 (1.47)
EPA: Tolerance Trump 2.08 (1.51) 2.29 (1.60)
of criminality Clinton 2.96 (1.63) 2.64 (1.59)
Total 2.58 (1.64) 2.49 (1.60)
A significant Supported candidate × Judged candidate
interaction, F(1,225) = 7.15, p = 0.008, ηp2 = 0.031, revealed
that prototypicality was perceived to be higher for the candidate
that participants supported. The ingroup unethical leader
was perceived as more group prototypical than the outgroup
unethical leader, supporting H1a. No other main effects or
interactions were significant (all Fs ≤ 3.27, p ≥ 0.072).
Regarding confidence in the candidate, there was a marginal
main effect of Judged candidate, F(1,266) = 3.23, p = 0.073,
ηp
2 = 0.012. Participants were slightly more confident that Hillary
Clinton would be a good president (M = 49.84, SD = 37.52)
than Donald Trump (M = 32.90, SD = 37.04). The main effect
of Supported candidate was not significant, F(1, 266) = 0.12,
p = 0.914. The significant Supported candidate × Judged
candidate interaction, F(1,266) = 1184.48, p< 0.001, ηp2 = 0.817,
showed the expected pattern, namely that participants believed
that the ingroup leader would be a better president than
the outgroup leader. That is, Trump supporters were more
confident in their candidate (ingroup condition) than in Hillary
Clinton (outgroup condition), and the same happened for
Clinton supporters, who were more confident in her (ingroup
condition) than in Donald Trump (outgroup condition),
supporting H1b. The main effects were not significant (all
Fs ≤ 3.23, p ≥ 0.073).
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TABLE 2 | ANOVA results for all variables without covariates included.
Voters main Candidate main Wave main Voters × Candidate Voters ×Wave Candidate ×Wave Voters × Candidate
effect effect effect ×Wave
American
Prototypicality
F (1,233) = 0.20,
p = 0.652
F (1,233) = 2.18,
p = 0.141








F (1,233) = 1.36,
p = 0.244








F (1,242) = 0.02,
p = 0.885








Evaluation F (1,233) = 0.89,
p = 0.346
















F (1,233) = 0.39,
p = 532




F (1,233) = 1.95,
p = 0.164
F (1,233) = 1.14,
p = 0.288






















F (1,233) = 0.79,
p = 0.376












F (1,233) = 2.44,
p = 0.119
F (1,233) = 1.44,
p = 0.231






















F (1,233) = 0.40,
p = 0.526
F (1,233) = 0.09,
p = 0.770
F (1,233) = 0.04,
p = 0.839








F (1,233) = 0.01,
p = 0.960




F (1,233) = 0.30,
p = 0.591








Stability F (1,233) = 0.01,
p = 0.969




F (1,233) = 2.22,
p = 0.137




F (1,233) = 0.01,
p = 0.942
F (1,233) = 0.01,
p = 0.971

























F (1,231) = 0.12,
p = 0.729










F (1,231) = 0.29,
p = 0.592




Regarding evaluation, a marginal main effect of Judged
candidate showed that overall Donald Trump was evaluated more
negatively (M = 3.42, SD = 0.51) than Hillary Clinton (M = 4.15,
SD = 0.55), F(1,225) = 3.61, p = 0.059, ηp2 = 0.016. There
was also a significant Supported candidate × Judged candidate
interaction, F(1,225) = 23.84, p< 0.001, ηp2 = 0.096. Participants
evaluated the ingroup leader more positively than the outgroup
leader, supporting H1c.
The Supported candidate × Wave interaction was also
significant, F(1,225) = 5.83, p = 0.017, ηp2 = 0.025, revealing
that Trump supporters gave less negative evaluations after the
election than before the election (M = 3.60, SD = 0.75; M = 3.34,
SD = 0.74, respectively; t(99) = 3.92, p < 0.001, g = −0.29, CI
[−0.57,−0.01]), regardless of the candidate being evaluated. The
pre-post difference was not significant for Clinton supporters,
t(145) = 1.316, p = 0.137. No other main effects or interactions
were significant (all Fs≤ 2.03, p≥ 0.156) regarding the evaluation
of the candidates.
The same pattern arose on the measure of self-promoting
motivation. The significant Supported candidate × Judged
candidate interaction, F(1,225) = 8.16, p = 0.005, ηp2 = 0.035,
indicated that participants perceived the outgroup unethical
leader to be more self-serving than the ingroup unethical leader
(cf. Table 1). Therefore, H1c was fully supported.
No other main effects or interactions were significant (all
Fs ≤ 3.35, p ≥ 0.068). No three-way interaction was found.
Therefore, H1d was not supported.
Attributional bias: H2 (a) Behavior of outgroup unethical
leaders will be attributed more to dispositional and stable
factors than that of ingroup unethical leaders; (b) this
relationship will be stronger for the candidate that loses
the election and weaker for the candidate that wins
the election.
Regarding locus of causality, a significant supported
candidate× Judged candidate interaction, F(1,225) = 7.61,
p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.033, showed participants perceived
the behavior of the outgroup unethical leader as more
dispositional than the behavior of the ingroup unethical
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leader. Therefore, H2a was supported for locus of causality.
No other main effects or interactions were found for
this variable (all Fs ≤ 2.01, p ≥ 0.158), thus, H2b
was not confirmed.
H2a and H2b were not supported for stability, because no
main effects nor interactions were significant (all Fs≤ 2.02,
p ≥ 0.156).
Effect of success: H3 We expect participants to attribute (a)
higher personal control and lower external control to the
outgroup unethical leader than to the ingroup unethical
leader; (b) and this relationship will be stronger if the
outgroup unethical leader wins the election, and weaker if
the ingroup leader wins the election.
Regarding personal control, a significant main effect of Wave,
F(1,225) = 5.41, p = 0.021, ηp2 = 0.023, revealed that participants
perceived candidates to have more control over their behaviors
after the election (M = 3.04, SD = 1.79) than before (M = 3.31,
SD = 1.62). However, these perceptions did not differ per
Candidate; thus, H3b was not supported. No other main effects
or interactions were found (all Fs ≤ 0.26, p ≥ 0.609). Therefore,
H3a was not supported for this variable.
A marginal Supported candidate x Judged candidate
interaction, F(1,225) = 3.85, p = 0.051, ηp2 = 0.017, revealed
that the ingroup leader was perceived as having more external
control (M = 6.13, SD = 1.63) than the outgroup leader (M = 7.37,
SD = 1.54). This pattern was significant for Clinton supporters
(ingroup M = 6.20, SD = 1.79; outgroup M = 7.42, SD = 1.58,
t(145) = 8.34, p < 0.001, g = 0.78, CI [0.54, 1.02]), but not for
Trump supporters (ingroup M = 6.59, SD = 1.58; outgroup
M = 6.33, SD = 1.79), t(97) = 1.09, p = 0.277. Therefore, H3a was
partially supported. No other main effects or interactions were
significant (all Fs ≤ 2.88, p ≥ 0.091).
Outcome based shift of standards (a) Voters should regard
unethical leadership to be more unacceptable and they
should support measures of social control more if the
ingroup unethical leader loses the election and (b) the
opposite pattern should arise if the ingroup unethical
leader wins the election.
Regarding acceptability of unethical leadership, a significant
main effect of Supported candidate, F(1,225) = 7.59, p = 0.006,
ηp
2 = 0.033, indicated Trump supporters found unethical
leadership to be less unacceptable (M = 2.34, SD = 1.11) than
did Clinton supporters (M = 1.62, SD = 1.12). The main effect
of Wave was not significant, F(1,225) = 0.06, p = 0.813.
Consistent with our hypothesis, a significant Supported
candidate × Wave interaction, F(1,225) = 8.61, p = 0.004,
ηp
2 = 0.037, showed that when the ingroup unethical leader won
the election (Trump supporters), unethical leadership became
more acceptable after the election (M = 2.63, SD = 1.67) than
before (M = 2.04, SD = 1.41), t(99) = 3.90, p < 0.001, g = −0.38,
CI [−0.66, −0.10]. The opposite pattern was found amongst
the group that lost the election (Clinton supporters). For them,
unethical leadership became even more unacceptable after the
election (M = 1.47, SD = 0.92) than before (M = 1.77, SD = 1.11),
FIGURE 1 | Trump and Clinton supporters’ Acceptance of unethical
Leadership Before and After 2016 US Presidential Election (means and
standard errors).
FIGURE 2 | Trump and Clinton supporters’ Acceptance of Stricter Election
Before and After 2016 US Presidential Election (means and standard errors).
t(134) = 3.62, p < 0.001, g = 0.29, CI [0.05, 0.53]. Thus, H4a and
H4b were supported for this variable (cf. Figure 1).
The election process adjustment (EPA) measure encompassed
two dimensions: stricter process and tolerance of criminality.
A significant Supported candidate x Wave interaction on stricter
process, F(1,225) = 10.25, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.044, showed that
Trump supporters became less approving of a strict process
following the election (preM = 4.75, SD = 1.43; postM = 4.13,
SD = 1.57), t(99) = 4.38, p < 0.001, g = 0.41, CI [0.13,
0.69]. In contrast, Clinton supporters believed that the process
should be made stricter post-election (preM = 4.55, SD = 1.27;
postM = 5.11, SD = 1.24), t(134) = 5.52, p < 0.001, g = −0.44,
CI [−0.69,−0.20]. Therefore, H4a and H4b were fully supported
(cf. Figure 2). The main effects were not significant (all
Fs ≤ 1.54, p ≥ 0.215).
The significant Supported candidate × Wave interaction
on tolerance of criminality revealed a comparable pattern,
F(1,225) = 4.51, p = 0.035, ηp2 = 0.020. Clinton supporters were
less tolerant of a leader’s criminal past following the election
than they had been before the election (preM = 2.96, SD = 1.63;
postM = 2.64, SD = 1.59; t(134) = 2.40, p = 0.018, g = 0.20, CI
[−0.04, 0.44]). In contrast, a marginal effect shows that Trump
supporters seemed to be more tolerant of leader criminality after
the election than before (preM = 2.08, SD = 1.51; postM = 2.29,
SD = 1.60), t(99) = 1.67, p = 0.098, g = −0.13, CI [−0.41, 0.14].
The main effects of Voters and Wave were not significant (all
Fs ≤ 1.16, p ≥ 0.283).
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DISCUSSION
When facing the situation of choosing or electing major leaders,
particularly in the political realm, it is rare that any candidate
has an unquestionable record. The question of how people select
leaders when the choices are reportedly unethical (and perceived
as unethical) has not been addressed by previous research.
The present research sheds light on some of the group-related
psychological processes that occur when people have to choose
between two reportedly unethical leaders. Our central general
proposition was that when unethical leadership is combined with
ingroup success, it encourages a subsequent relaxation of ethical
standards, both to justify the success and to enable unethical
success to continue.
Although our sample of voters considered both candidates
overall as being low in ethicality and as non-prototypical,
they evaluated their ingroup leader more positively, as more
ethical, as more prototypical, and as less self-promoting than the
outgroup leader. The behavior of the ingroup leader was also
perceived as affected more by external/situational (rather than
internal/dispositional) factors than was the outgroup leader’s
behavior. Moreover, the election result impacted on voters’
acceptance of unethical leadership. When the ingroup leader
lost the election, unethical leadership became less acceptable
and strengthened the desire for a stricter election process.
However, when the ingroup leader won the election, unethical
leadership became more acceptable and group members were
content to relax the election process. This helps to establish
that perception of the acceptability of unethical leadership is
dynamic, and not stable over time or context. Moreover, these
shifts on attitudes based on ingroup/outgroup success are in line
with previous research showing individuals’ needs to maintain
balance and to protect their self-esteem by either affiliating
more strongly to their group if it is victorious and less so if
it loses (cf. BIRGing/CORFing literature, Cialdini et al., 1976;
Cialdini and Richardson, 1980).
Overall, the more positive evaluations given to the ingroup
leader, when compared to the outgroup leader, are consistent
with social identity theory’s assumption that individuals strive
to achieve and maintain a positive social identity and, therefore,
when engaging in social comparison, they tend to display an
ingroup bias (cf. Abrams and Hogg, 1988). Similarly, the fact that
the ingroup leader was perceived as being less self-promoting is
also consistent with previous findings (e.g., van Knippenberg and
van Knippenberg, 2005) which suggest that a leader who displays
self-sacrifice communicates the message of being pro-group
oriented which, in turn, shows commitment to the collective and
attracts stronger support.
In terms of causal attributions, participants perceived the
behavior of the outgroup leader to be less affected by external
factors and more by the leaders’ internal dispositions, when
compared to the behavior of ingroup leaders. This is consistent
with Allison and Messick’s (1985) finding that people make
stronger dispositional attributions for behaviors by outgroup
members than by ingroup members. However, these results did
not change according to the election outcome, as we would
expect, and an ultimate attribution error did not occur. One
possible explanation may be related to the impact of perceptions
of ethicality when making attributions, as the Wave effect
disappeared when controlling for this measure. Moreover, as
leaders occupy a central role within the group, it makes sense
that their overall behavior is perceived as stable and as being
under high personal and low external control (Hogg et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, we expected these perceptions to be affected by
participants’ group membership and to depend on the results
of the election. Indeed, participants attributed lower external
control to the outgroup leader than to ingroup leader, but this
result was only verified for Clinton Voters, and did not extend to
attributions of stability or personal control.
Based on the present evidence, the 2016 US election results
may have had a discernable impact on some supporters’
willingness to accept unethical leadership. The generality of the
finding that unethical leadership was more acceptable when the
election was won by the ingroup leader and more unacceptable
when won by the outgroup leader is informed by consistency
with evidence from Morton et al. (2007) experiments. They
found that participants were more tolerant of an ingroup deviant
political candidate when they perceived the public opinion to be
against their group, considering it to be more important that the
group achieved its goals (electing their candidate). The present
research shows that acceptance of unethical leadership in general
is also manifested in varying levels of demand for social control.
Voters for the winning candidate subsequently advocated a more
relaxed electoral process whereas voters for the losing candidate
endorsed a stricter election process. Thus, the ingroup benefit of
any unethical leader behavior affects not only group members’
endorsement of their leader, but also their willingness to tolerate
unethical leadership in future.
These findings have implications for our understanding of
system justification or procedural justice processes (Tyler, 1987;
cf. Azzi and Jost, 1997; Blasi and Jost, 2006), which could
be pursued in future research. It also suggests why it is that
leaders who succeed in bending the rules to strengthen their
ingroup’s power or achievements seem to be able to attract further
support from their electorates (despotic or populist leadership
of the major continents and countries such as Turkey spring
to mind), despite questions surrounding the propriety of their
actions. If voters relax their ethical standards for leadership as
a means of bolstering the legitimacy of their ingroup’s success,
this could foster abandonment of such standards, allowing the
consolidation of increasingly ruthless and unethical governance.
CONCLUSION
Taking the US Presidential election as a framework, the
present research shows that group members’ perceptions of
leadership ethicality may affect behavioral attributions about
their leaders, and the acceptability and endorsement of future
unethical leadership. This supports the central argument of
the present article, that when unethical ingroup leadership
succeeds (wins) it encourages both transgression credit and a
relaxation of that group’s ethical standards. This potential for
leader-driven ethical slippage underlines how important it is
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that organizations should institute and maintain procedures to
hold their leaders to account and to ensure that they uphold
scrupulous ethical standards.
Although it would be desirable to find a more ethnically
diverse sample as the majority of the present sample (85%) was
Caucasian, our sample is not dissimilar from the electorate (cf.
Supplementary Material; Pew Research Center, 2018). However,
other differences among Clinton and Trump supporters, such as
their personality or political ideology, may contribute to the effect
of winning/losing on ethicality. Our real-life real-time study has
the advantage of high ecological and external validity, dealing
with an issue of considerable political and global significance,
given the current rise of populism. Moreover, our research
suggests that members of victorious groups might conclude that
“the ends justify the means,” such that they are more willing to
accept the unacceptable in order to gain or retain power for an
ingroup leader. Future research could explore, experimentally or
longitudinally, possible causal roles of various factors that might
increase or attenuate the likelihood that unethical victors will
induce relaxation of ethical standards among their supporters, as
well as test these effects for different intergroup relations.
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